THE MEANING OF "GENERAL LAWS": THE EXTENT OF
CONGRESS'S POWER UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT

JULIE L. B. JOHNSONt
INTRODUCTION

On September 21, 1996, President Clinton signed the Defense of
Marriage Act ("DOMA" or "Act") into law.' The Act is a direct
response to a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Hawaii, Baehr
v. Lewin,2 that ultimately may lead to the recognition of same-sex

t A.B. 1992, Duke University; J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Pennsylvania. I
would like to thank Professor Seth Kreimer of the University of Pennsylvania for
providing me with the idea for this Comment and for his generous assistance. I have
also benefited from conversations with William Eskridge, Jr., Professor of Law at
Georgetown University Law Center, and Andrew Chirls, Partner at Wolf, Block, Schorr,
& Solis-Cohen, in Philadelphia. Lastly, I would like to thank the members of the Law
Review for their unpaid and largely unrewarded efforts. Any errors remaining, however, should be attributed to them anyway.
Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C
(West Supp. 1997) and 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1997)).
2 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The plaintiffs, three homosexual couples, challenged
their denial of marriage licenses on several grounds. See id. at 48-50. The court,
holding that fundamental rights under the Hawaii Constitution are coextensive with
fundamental rights under the Constitution of the United States, first held that couples
do not possess a fundamental right to same-sex marriage, based on privacy or other
grounds. See id. at 57. The court, however, did find that the state statute granting
marriage licenses only to opposite-sex couples constituted sex-based discrimination, see
id. at 60, thus implicating the equal protection guarantees of the Hawaii Constitution,
as modified by an equal rights amendment, see id. at 63-67. The court went on to
conclude that, for purposes of equal protection analysis under the Hawaii
Constitution, sex was a "suspect category" subject to strict scrutiny. See id. at 67. The
court thus declined to decide whether sexual orientation was a suspect category,
finding that the sexual orientation of the plaintiffs was irrelevant to their decision. See
id. at 58 n.17. The Hawaii Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court to
determine whether the state could prove that the statute denying marriage licenses to
same-sex couples furthered a compelling state interest and was narrowly drawn to
avoid unnecessary constitutional deprivations. See id. at 68.
On remand, the Hawaii Circuit Court held that the state had failed to meet its
burden. See Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 3, 1996). To prevent potential chaos, the court issued an order suspending the
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marriages in Hawaii. The DOMA contains two substantive provisions. One provision defines "marriage" and "spouse" for federal
purposes as requiring two persons of the opposite sex.5 The other
substantive provision, section 2 of the Act, provides that states do not

issuance of licenses to same-sex couples until a final decision has been reached by the
Hawaii Supreme Court. See Ellen Goodman, Delayed Trips to Altar May Gain More for
Gays, ARIZ. REPUBLUC, Dec. 12, 1996, at B7, available in 1996 WL 7761488.

" Throughout this Comment, the terms "same-sex" and "homosexual" are used
interchangeably. It bears emphasis, however, that the terms are not synonymous. For
example, a homosexual marriage could also be defined as a marriage between a
homosexual man and a lesbian woman. Likewise, a same-sex marriage could be a
marriage in which one or both of the parties is heterosexual. This distinction was
pointed out in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d at 51 n.11. As a practical matter, the majority
of same-sex couples seeking the right to marry probably would be homosexual
couples. There are other possibilities, however, such as two elderly individuals who
choose to live together for financial reasons and companionship, who comprise a
family of sorts, and who would appreciate the numerous benefits of marriage.
' See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2 (1996) (noting the Act's specific purpose of
responding to Baehr v. Lewin).

The aftermath of Baehr v. Lewin has been

extraordinary. Apart from provoking the passage of the DOMA, many states,
including Hawaii, have reacted. The Hawaii state legislature passed legislation
limiting marital rights to opposite-sex couples in an attempt to sway the court's
decision on remand. See Hawaii's Marriage Laws Don't Sanction Same-Sex Marriages,20

Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1448, at 1448 (Aug. 2, 1994) [hereinafter Hawaii'sMarriageLaws].
This legislation, however, would have no force if the decision in Baehr v. Miike is
upheld by the Hawaii Supreme Court. Thus, the state has called for the only
remaining option: a constitutional convention, which has been scheduled for 1998 to
discuss amending or repealing the equal rights amendment to the Hawaii Constitution
to strip the Baehrdecision of its constitutional support. See Hawaii Seeks Law to Block
Gay Marriag4N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1997, atA15 [hereinafter HawaiiSeeks Law].
" See Defense of Marriage Act § 3. The Supreme Court has often referred to the
regulation of marriage as being under the exclusive control of the states. See, e.g.,
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 354 (1948) ("[U]nder the Constitution the regulation
and control of marital and family relationships are reserved to the States."); Williams v.
North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1945) (stating the need for "due regard for [a]
most important aspect of our federalism whereby 'the domestic relations of husband
and wife ... were matters reserved to the States,' and do not belong to the United
States" (omission in original) (quoting Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 384
(1930))). The federal government, however, may not be constitutionally bound by
state definitions of terms such as "marriage" and "spouse." For example, Congress has
defined "spouse" for purposes of Social Security benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(a), (b),
(f) (1994). In addition, a federal court has suggested, in dictum, that a same-sex
marriage, valid under state law, "might still be insufficient to confer spouse status for
purposes of federal immigration law." Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039 (9th
Cir. 1982). However, as the court pointed out, Congress may impose burdens on
aliens that would be unconstitutional if imposed on citizens. See id. at 1042. This
Comment does not address section 3 of the Act or the constitutional question of
Congress's authority to define these terms contrary to state definitions.
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have to recognize a same-sex marriage performed and valid in
another state.6 The latter provision is the focus of this Comment.
In enacting section 2 of the DOMA, Congress purported to act
pursuant to its power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution.7 The Full Faith and Credit Clause allows Congress to
prescribe "by general Laws" the effect that one state's "public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings" will have in every other state."
Prior to the Act, Congress had exercised power under this Clause on
only three occasions.9 Each time it acted either to clarify or to extend
the application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause; for example, by
mandating full faith and credit for custody decrees to ensure cooperation among the states.'0 The DOMA is thus the first attempt by
Congress to limit application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
This congressional withdrawal of full faith and credit, on its own,
raises constitutional concerns. Some commentators believe that the
Act is unconstitutional because the limiting of full faith and credit
contravenes the unifying principles of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause." However, there is no direct support for this proposition in

6

See Defense of Marriage Act § 2.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.

8Id&

See infra note 56.
U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
" Professor Laurence Tribe, in a letter submitted to the Senate and incorporated
into the record, argued that "[i]t would do violence not only to the letter but also to
the spirit of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to construe it as a fount of affirmative
authority for Congress... to set asunder the States that this clause brought together."
142 CONG. REC. S5933 (daily ed.June 6, 1996) (letter of Professor Laurence H. Tribe).
There is at least indirect support for this position in that the Supreme Court has always
interpreted the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a means to unify the
various states into a cohesive whole. See, e.g., Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 & n.9
(1951) (describing the "strong unifying principle embodied in the Full Faith and
Credit Clause"); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) ("[The Full Faith and Credit
Clause] ordered submission by one State even to hostile policies reflected in the
judgment of another State, because the practical operation of the federal system,
which the Constitution designed, demanded it."); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,
320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943) ("The full faith and credit clause ... became a nationally
unifying force. It altered the status of the several states as independent foreign
sovereignties... by making each an integral part of a single nation, in which rights
judicially established in any part are given nation-wide application.").
The Court, however, has never confronted the specific question whether Congress
can withhold application of full faith and credit. There is no reason, in theory, why
Congress could not exempt broad classes of records, acts, or proceedings from the
demands of full faith and credit. Cf.Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 215 n.2
(1933) (Stone, J., dissenting) ("[T]he mandatory force of the full faith and credit
Q

10 See 28
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either the text or the legislative history of the Clause or its
It is therefore uncertain whether the Supreme
implementing act.
Court would overturn the statute on this ground.
A more suspect facet of this legislation is its selective impact on
the recognition of extraterritorial acts, records, and judicial proceedings.1 3 With regard to acts and records, the Act will disrupt the general rule that a marriage valid in one state will be recognized in every
other state.' 4 The disruption with regard to judicial proceedings will
be even greater. As the full faith and credit doctrine has evolved over
the last two centuries, it has been applied with the most rigor to state
judgments.'" The DOMA, however, declares that even a state judgneed not be given full faith and
ment validating a same-sex marriage
6
credit in another state's court.'
Thus, the first reason that this reversal in the full faith and credit
doctrine is problematic is that it singles out a very narrow class of acts,
records, and judgments to be denied full faith and credit. Congress's
power to legislate regarding the effect of acts, records, and proceedings is limited to "general Laws." 7 Although there has been almost
no discussion of this aspect of the Clause, the language suggests that
Congress may make only general rules regarding extraterritorial
recognition, and may not target a specific segment of acts, records, or
judgments.
Perhaps even more disturbing is the portent of the Act if allowed
to stand: the asserted ability of Congress to restrict the scope of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause through legislation. If Congress is perclause as defined by this Court may be, in some degree not yet fully defined, expanded

or contracted by Congress.").
12 For a discussion of Congress's power to legislate under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, see infta Part V.A.
is At the least, the unprecedented nature of this legislation should arouse the
Court's suspicion. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996) (asserting that
"'[d] iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to
determine whether they are obnoxious to the [equal protection] provision.'") (first
alteration in original) (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 3738 (1928)).

"4See discussion infra Part II.A. It is important to note that because the Supreme
Court has not determined whether a marriage would be regarded as a "public act" or
.record" within the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, states usually refer to
comity concerns, rather than full faith and credit, when recognizing a marriage valid
in another state. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 38 (1996) (citing ALBERT A.
EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLIcT OF LAWS § 138 (1961)).
'5 See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
16 See Defense of Marriage Act § 2, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1738C (West Supp. 1997).
17 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, §
1.
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mitted to withdraw the mandate of full faith and credit from specific
acts, records, orjudgments, the status of each state as an independent
sovereign within our federal system is vulnerable. Just as Hawaii may
find that some of its marriages and judicial decrees may be disregarded by other states, as a matter of federal law, so too Kentucky may
find that another state need not honor its commercial contracts, or
Wyoming may discover that its wrongful death judgment will not
always be enforced in every other state." In combination, the narrowmess of the Act and its unprecedented limiting purpose should be
sufficient grounds for the Supreme Court to declare the Act unconstitutional.
A full understanding of the legislation's potential unconstitutionality requires an examination of many substantive areas, including the
history of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, its interpretation against a
background of conflict-of-laws rules, and their combined application
to the unique area of marriage.
Traditionally, states have recognized a marriage as valid if it would
be valid in the state in which it was performed.' 9 However, states have
sometimes refused to do so when such recognition would violate a
strong public policy of the state.20 The ostensible purpose of the
DOMA is to bolster the states' ability to deny recognition of extraterritorial same-sex marriages. 2' The public policy exception already
available to the states may appear to render section 2 of the DOMA
superfluous. However, closer examination reveals that Congress
purports to do far more than codify the existing public policy excep-

'8 Many congressional opponents of the DOMA accused its supporters of making a

"power grab" from the states. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S10,107 (daily ed. Sept. 10,
1996) (statement of Sen. Kerry). In addition, Professor Laurence Tribe suggested that

passage of the DOMA would make possible increased congressional interference with
the states, as an interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause that validated the
DOMA "would entail the conclusion that congress may constitutionally decree that no
Hawaii marriage, no California divorce, no Kansas defaultjudgment... need[s] to be

given any legal effect at all by any State that chooses to avail itself of a congressional
license to ignore the Full Faith and Credit Clause." 142 CONG. EFC. S5932 (daily ed.

June 6, 1996) (letter of Professor Laurence H. Tribe). For a further discussion of this
issue, see infra Part V.B.
'9 See discussion infra Part II.A.
2o See RESTATEfENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971).

For a
discussion of application of this exception, see infra Part II.B.
21 See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996) (describing the second primary purpose
of the DOMA as "protect[ing] the right of the States to formulate their own public

policy regarding the legal recognition of same-sex unions").
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tion.22 A background understanding of these subjects highlights the
constitutional infirmities of section 2 of the DOMA.
Part I of this Comment discusses the drafting and interpretation
the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, and describes its coordination
of
with conflict-of-laws rules. The application of these combined doctrines to extraterritorial marriages, generally ensuring their recognition by sister states, is outlined in Part II. Part III provides a
discussion of the forces behind, and against, same-sex marriages,
including the policy reasons advanced against recognitioh of these
unions. Part IV describes the text and legislative history of the DOMA
as revealing both the motives and constitutional concerns of the
members of Congress. Part V summarizes these issues in an analysis
of the constitutionality of the DOMA. It concludes that section 2 of
the Act should be found unconstitutional on the grounds that it
exceeds Congress's power to legislate, by "general Laws," under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause and that it unduly interferes with the
status of the states as independent sovereigns23

22 Section 2 of the DOMA gives no additional power to a state which has a strong,
established public policy against same-sex marriage and which is considering the
validity of a marriage in which it has significant interest. However, if a state does not
have a strong public policy established against same-sex marriage, the DOMA purports

to grant states the right to deny recognition of another state's marriage when it might
not otherwise have the power to do so. Thus, courts would not have to point to an
existing public policy in order to invalidate a same-sex marriage. Relieved of their
usual burden under a choice-of-law analysis, judges will be more likely to deny
recognition of another state's same-sex marriage. In addition, courts will not likely be
presented with alternative state legislation authorizing recognition, the passage of
which is currently politically infeasible. Thus, the net effect of the Act will be to
frustrate the recognition of same-sex marriages. This argument will be discussed in
more detail in Part V.B.
2' The DOMA is constitutionally suspect on other grounds as well: It may unduly
interfere with the right to travel or violate equal protection in the wake of Romer v.
Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (invalidating, on equal protection grounds,
legislation that would have prevented the extension of non-discrimination protection
to homosexuals). It may also conflict with the requirements of the Due Process
Clause. SeeAllstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (noting that the Court
has, under the Due Process Clause, "invalidated the choice of law of a State which has
had no significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and the occurrence or transaction"). A discussion of these
alternative constitutional challenges is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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I. THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
A. History andEvolution
Although a substantial amount of scholarly attention has been
paid to the history of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 24 the informa-

tion surrounding the drafting of the Clause is sparse. Prior to the
Revolution, a colony confronted with a statute or judgment from
another colony would usually decline to recognize the statute or
judgment and would resolve the issue anew.25 The Articles of
Confederation
included a provision similar to its constitutional
26
successor.
This provision may have represented an attempt to
militate against the disregard, inherited from England, for extraterritorial enactments or decisions. 2' This initial provision in the
Articles differed, however, from the Full Faith and Credit Clause in
28
that it lacked a grant of power to Congress and was interpreted and
applied as a strictly evidentiary rule.2 The somewhat tepid success of

24

See, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the FullFaithand Credit

Claus 28 YALE LJ. 421 (1919); Edward S. Corwin, The "FullFaith and Credit" Clause, 81
U. PA. L. REV. 371 (1933); Robert H. Jackson, FullFaith and Credit-TheLauyer's Clause
of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1945); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and
Credit toJudgments and Public Acts: A Historical-AnalyticalReappraisal,56 MIcH. L. REV.
33 (1957); James D. Sumner, Jr., The Full-Faith-and-CreditClause-Its History and Purpose,
34 OR. L. REv. 224 (1955); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State
Choice of Law: Full Faith and Credit, 12 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1981) [hereinafter
Whitten I]; Ralph U. Whitten, The ConstitutionalLimitationson State-CourtJurisdiction: A
Historical-InterpretativeReexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses
(PartOne), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499 (1981) [hereinafter Whitten II].
SeeSumner, supra note 24, at 226-27 (describing the almost total lack of recognition afforded to legislation and judicial proceedings from either a foreign colony or
nation); Whitten II, supra note 24, at 527-35 (providing a detailed account of the
interaction among the colonies leading up to the drafting of the Articles of
Confederation).
SeeARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (U.S. 1778).
27 See Sumner, supra note 24, at 228 ("By the time of the Continental
Congress we
can assume that many people, in particular the lawyers, were of the opinion that a
more civilized attitude should be taken towards the acts of other colonies."). But see
Nadelmann, supra note 24, at 48-49 (questioning whether the provision was intended
as more than an evidentiary rule); Whitten I, supra note 24, at 31 (arguing that the
provision "addressed only a limited evidentiary command to the states").
See Cook, supra note 24, at 423-24 (noting that Congress was powerless to define
the meaning of "full faith and credit" through legislation).
See Sumner, supra note 24, at 230 (noting that courts held the rule to be
"nothing more than a rule of evidence").
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this initial provision prompted the members of the Constitutional
Convention to set out to craft a better solution.30
Thus, when it came time to draft the version for the Constitution,
the initial clause provided that, "[f]ull faith shall be given in each
State to the acts of the Legislatures, and to the records and judicial
proceedings of the Courts and Magistrates of every other State."'
The suggestion by James Madison to authorize Congress "to provide
for the execution ofJudgments in other States" 32 led to the proposal of
the following provision: "and the Legislature shall by general laws
prescribe the manner in which such acts, Records, & proceedings
shall be proved, and the effect which Judgments obtained in one
State, shall have in another."33 When the clause reached its final
form, the word "shall" had been replaced with "may," and the power
of Congress had been extended to "prescrib[ing] the effect" of acts,
records, and judicial proceedings. 4 The drafters made this latter
change over the protest of Mr. Randolph, a convention member from
Virginia, that "its definition of the powers of the Government was so
loose as to give it opportunities of usurping all the State powers. " "
This history, albeit brief, strongly suggests that the drafters were
cautious about extending the authority of Congress. s1 In addition,
the drafters intended the Clause to unify the newly joined states into a
nation. The Supreme Court has recognized this underlying purpose:
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is not to be applied, accordion-like, to
accommodate our personal predilections. It substituted a command for

the earlier principles of comity and thus basically altered the status of
the States as independent sovereigns. It ordered submission by one
State even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment of another State,

because the practical operation of
3 7 the federal system, which the
Constitution designed, demanded it.

" See id. at 243 (asserting that "[t]he accounts of the convention proceedings
clearly show that the writers of the [Constitution] sought to eliminate the freedom of
the states in disregarding the official acts of sister states").
"' See 2 THE RECoRDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 188 (Max Farrand
ed., Isted. 1911) [hereinafter Farrand).
-2 See id. at 448.

See id. at 485.
See Cook, supra note 24, at 425-26.
Farrand, supra note 31, at 488-89.
See Whitten II, supra note 24, at 549-50 (referring to James Madison's belief that
authorizing Congress to provide for the execution, as opposed to evidence, ofjudgments "'might be safely done and was justified by the nature of the Union'" (quoting
Farrand, supra note 31, at 448)).
3' Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1948) (citations omitted).
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Having been granted the authority to legislate, Congress
promptly provided for the means of authenticating public acts and
judicial records and proceedings in the Act of May 26, 1790.8 The
Act passed quickly; if there was any debate over its passage, there is no
record of it.39

Shortly thereafter, in the Act of March 27, 1804,

Congress provided for the authentication of non-judicial records and
expanded the reach of
the implementing act to include the territories
40
of the United States.

During the infancy of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, there was
considerable debate about how to interpret the Clause and its
implementing act, focusing primarily on whether they were intended
to be discretionary or self-executing.4 ' Because courts had interpreted
"full faith and credit," as used in the Articles of Confederation, to be
an evidentiary rule, they initially ••adopted
this interpretation when
42
applying the constitutional provision. The Supreme Court finally
resolved the debate in Mills v. Duryee, in favor of regarding the Clause
as self-executing and conclusive, rather than as a mere evidentiary
rule.45 The dissent by Justice Johnson objected that the decision left
1 Stat. 122.
See Nadelmann, supra note 24, at 60 & n.124 (commenting on the lack of
records).
'0 2 Stat. 298. See Sumner, supra note 24, at 235-36 (describing Congress's early
legislation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause). In 1948, Congress incorporated
these two acts, which earlier had been merged into one provision, into the United
States Code. SeeAct ofJune 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 773, 62 Stat. 869, 947 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1994)).
'I See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The ConstitutionalFoundationsof Choice of Law, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 249, 292-95 (1992) (arguing that
the drafting record demonstrated the explicit intention to have the Clause be selfexecuting); Nadelmann, supra note 24, at 62-71 (discussing the early nineteenthcentury debate); Whitten II, supra note 24, at 552-67 (concluding the Clause was
intended as an evidentiary rule and the implementing act rendered it self-executing).
4' See Whitten II, supra note 24, at 559-65 (describing the interpretive debate from
1790 to 1813).
43 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 484-85 (1813). Some commentators have
argued that
the Supreme Court was interpreting only the implementing act, not the Clause itself.
See Whitten I, supra note 24, at 50-51 & n.257. According to Professor Whitten, the
Court incorrectly interpreted the implementing act as conclusive rather than as
merely evidentiary. See id. at 50-55; see also Nadelmann, supra note 24, at 68-69
(arguing that the Mills decision was based on the implementing act alone). Justice
Story, the author of the Mills opinion, later wrote that, contrary to his Mills opinion,
the Clause must be interpreted as self-executing, or "otherwise, Congress could have
power to repeal or vary the full faith and credit given by the clause." Nadelmann,
supra note 24, at 70 (citing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1306 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833)). It has been suggested, however, that ifJustice Story had had access to the notes ofJames Madison at
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states "at liberty to pass the most absurd laws [and it is] out of our
power to prevent the execution of judgments obtained under those
laws."" As the Court continued to bolster the strength of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, dissenting opinions continued to warn of the
dangers of broadly interpreting its scope, 45 resulting in an uncertain
full faith and credit doctrine. Thus, the degree to which a state must
recognize "public acts, records and judicial proceedings" of sister
states is "still disput[ed]."4 Part of this uncertainty stems from the
exceptions created as the full faith and credit doctrine evolved.
Although the public acts and records of one state generally are given
full faith and credit in every other state, such credit may be denied if
doing so would contravene a public policy of the forum state.7
Judgments, in contrast, have been accorded much greater deference and are entitled to the most stringent full faith and credit
requirements. 48 Circumspection regarding judgments dates back to

the time of this writing, he might have interpreted the Clause differently. See id.
(noting thatJustice Story did not know of the change in the language from "ought" to
"shall"); Whitten I, supra note 24, at 51 n.257 (noting thatJustice Story did not have
Madison's notes). Regardless of the correctness of the Mills decision, it has been
firmly established in full faith and credit jurisprudence that the Clause is conclusive.
SeeJackson, supra note 24, at 11 ("[T]he Constitutional [Full Faith and Credit] provision must now be regarded as self-executing .... ."). This interpretation does not end
the matter, however, as the exceptions to the rule are just as firmly established. See
infra notes 47-48 (explaining several exceptions).
44Mills, 11 U.S. at 486-87 (Johnson,J, dissenting).
'S See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). In this case, the Court held
that Mississippi was bound by a Missouri court decision that enforced a gambling
contract performed in Mississippi in violation of its public policy. See id. at 237. The
Court determined that, although the Missouri court based its decision on an erroneous interpretation of Mississippi state law, the courts of Mississippi were required to
give Missouri's judgment full faith and credit. See id. The dissent argued that "the
effect will be to endow each State with authority to overthrow the public policy.., of
the others." Id. at 239 (White,J., dissenting).
46 Cook, supra note 24, at 421.
4 See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
294 U.S. 532, 547
(1935) (holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require states to
enforce statutes that contravene their public policy). This public policy exception,
however, is not unlimited. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822
(1985) (finding that the forum state had insufficient interest in the claims being
litigated to apply its own law rather than the laws of other states).
49 See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S.
430, 437 (1943) ("The full
faith and credit clause and the Act of Congress implementing it have, for most purposes, placed a judgment on a different footing from a statute of one state, judicial
recognition of which is sought in another."), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v.
Washington Gaslight Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); Brainerd Currie, Full Faith and Credit,
Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 SUP. Cr. REv. 89, 91-109 (comparing the
full faith and credit accorded to public acts with that accorded tojudgments).
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the Constitutional Convention, when James Madison "wished the
Legislature might be authorized to provide for the execution of
Judgments in other States." 9 The rationale for this policy has been
largely predicated on the doctrine of res judicata, which precludes a
collateral attack on ajudgment or an issue decided therein once fully
litigated. This principle demonstrates respect for the courts of the
deciding state and provides finality to judgments and security to the
parties involved. °
Cognizant of this preferential treatment of judgments, and concerned that a same-sex couple might bolster the validity of their
marriage with a judgment, Congress expressly included judgments
within the ambit of the DOMAs' A marriage probably would be
regarded as either a public act or record. s2 In many states, however,
the marital status of the parties is an appropriate matter for declaratory judgment.53 A judgment of marital status also might arise in
collateral disputes.5
Throughout this development of full faith and credit, and up to
the present, the Supreme Court has been uncharacteristically silent
on the issue of Congress's power under the Clause, although this
reticence can be attributed largely to Congress's rare invocations of its
power to legislate under the Clause. The Act of May 26, 1790, dis-

Even judgments are not given full faith and credit without exception. For example, the Supreme Court quickly excepted the recognition of judgments made on
improper jurisdiction from the demands of full faith and credit, see Thompson v.
Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 468-69 (1873) (holding that "the jurisdiction of the
court by which ajudgment is rendered in any State may be questioned in a collateral
proceeding in another State"), and has recognized a limited public policy exception to
the recognition of extraterritorial judgments, see Alaska PackersAss'n, 294 U.S. at 546
("[T]here are some limitations upon the extent to which a state will be required by the
full faith and credit clause to enforce even the judgment of another state, in contravention of its own statutes or policy.").
49Farrand, supranote 31, at 448.
5OSee, e.g., Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979) (noting that the doctrine of
res judicata "encourages reliance on judicial decisions, bars vexatious litigation, and
frees the courts to resolve other disputes").
-" See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 28-29 (1996) (noting that section 2 of the DOMA
applies to any public act, record, orjudicial proceeding).
-2 See id. at 37 (noting that "it would appear from the face of the
[Full Faith and
Credit] clause [that marriages] should be afforded full faith and credit as either Acts
or Records").
" See, e.g., Hager v. Hager, 349 S.E.2d 908, 909 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (declaring a
marriage invalid); 26 C.J.S. DeclaratoryJudgments§ 38 (1956) ("The marital status of the
parties is a proper subject for declaratory relief.").
-"See 1 LYNN WARDLE ET AL, CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW § 2.03, at 16 (1988)
("Frequently the issue of marriage validity arises collaterally....").
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cussed earlier, 55 was Congress's first exercise of this power. Since that
time, Congress has enacted legislation under the Full Faith and
56
Credit Clause on only three other occasions. Exacerbating this lack
of congressional attention is the Supreme Court's infrequent
discussion of the Clause's purpose.57 As the Court has not offered
much guidance with respect to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the
result has been a potpourri of state court decisions applying the
Clause against the background of the applicable choice-of-law rules.
We now turn to this relationship.
B. Coordinationwith the Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine
The full faith and credit doctrine, as expressed in both the Clause
and its implementing act, was established against a background of
conflict-of-laws rules, and there is considerable evidence that the
Framers expected it to be applied within such a context.58 Every state
has enacted choice-of-law rules. When confronted with an extraterritorial act, proceeding, or judgment, states first examine their own
choice-of-law rules to determine what law to apply.59 Usually, this
results in the forum state deciding what effect the state with the
greatest interest would give to the judgment, and applying that effect.6° The two complementary doctrines of full faith and credit and
conflict-of-laws work together. As shall be discussed shortly, this set of

55See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
s6 See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994) (full faith and credit given to protection orders); 28
U.S.C. § 1738A (1994) (full faith and credit given to child custody determinations); 28
U.S.C. § 1738B (1994) (full faith and credit given to child support orders).
57 See Laycock, supra note 41, at 257 (criticizing the Court for "a long
period of
inconclusive decisions" that led to the Court "all but abandon [ing] the field").
s, See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 n.1 (1988) (referring to the
.conflicts law embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause"); Laycock, supra note 41,
at 289-90 (arguing that the Framers assumed that choice-of-law rules would be applied
in the application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
A House Report on the DOMA states that "Section 2 does not.., determine the
choice-of-law issue .... But Section 2 does mean that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
will play no role in that choice of law determination .... " H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at
25-26 (1996).
s9 EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLCT OF LAWS § 3.1, at 49 (2d ed. 1992).
*0 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971); see also Laycock,
supra note 41, at 253 (describing how the Second Restatement "directed courts to
apply the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the controversy,
after considering every factor thought to be relevant under any theory then extant").
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doctrines has produced great variety, and confusion, among the states
regarding the recognition of extraterritorial marriages. 1
II. CONFLICT OF LAWS AND MARRIAGE

A. Lex Loci Celebrationis and the Presumption of the
Validity of Marriage
In general, there is a rebuttable presumption that marriages,
once performed, are valid. 6' The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws states the general rule, often cited, that a marriage that is valid63
in the performing state will be recognized as valid in all other states.64
The rule is referred to as lex loci celebrationis or lex loci contractus.
Reinforcing this general doctrine are various policy arguments advanced for the presumption of validity of marriages,6 and in particular for marriages that involve children. 66
Marriage entails many legal rights and responsibilities, but also
implicates matters of great intimacy. Therefore, the treatment of
marital relationships demands great protection for the interests of
both the married individuals and the state in which the couple resides. 67 In this way, the treatment of marriage is unique within the
61 See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
" See generally LENNART PALSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS:
SuBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS 7-79 (1981).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971).
See 55 C.J.S. Marriage§ 4(b) (1948) ("The general rule is that the validity of a
marriage is determined by the law of the place where it was contracted."); see also
Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934) (applying the lex lod contractusrule).
's See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) cmt. b (1971)

("[T]he protection of the justified expectations of the parties is of considerable
importance in the case of marriage ... .");SCOLES & HAY, supra note 59, § 13.2, at 431
(describing the strong policy of validating marriages that are freely entered); RUSSELL
J.WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5.1C, at 233-36 (3d ed. 1986)
(enumerating reasons for policy of validation).
See PALSsON, supra note 62, at 13 (stating that American policy is to uphold "the
legitimacy of children born of the union").
67 See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) (asserting that the
marriage "[d]omicil implies a nexus between person and place of such permanence as
to control the creation of legal relations and responsibilities of the utmost significance"). The Court also noted that marriage "is of concern not merely to the immediate parties. It affects personal rights of the deepest significance. It also touches basic
interests of society.... [Elvery consideration of policy makes it desirable that the
effect should be the same wherever the question arises." Id. at 230. In the same case,
however, the Court noted that "[t]he domicil of one spouse within a State gives power
to that State... to dissolve a marriage wheresoever contracted." Id. at 229-30.
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conflict-of-laws rules. Individuals who marry have an obvious interest
in the recognition of their union. States have an equally strong
interest in regulating marriage within their borders.6 These interests
are often antagonistic, and may be further complicated if the interests
of more than one state are implicated.6
As with any conflict-of-laws issue, states look to their own choiceof-laws rules in applying the doctrine of lex loci.70 Many states have
specifically adopted statutes regarding the recognition of extraterritorial marriages.7 ' For example, seventeen states have adopted a
strict lex loci rule] 2 Other states have adopted "evasion" or other
limiting statutes that govern recognition of marriages formed in other
73
states solely for the purpose of evading the laws of the domicile state.
In analyzing whether a same-sex marriage would be recognized,
careful attention must be paid to the choice-of-laws rules existing in
the state involved. This is particularly the case with regard to that
state's rules governing the public policy exception to the full faith
and credit doctrine.7 4
B. The PublicPolicy Exception: Applications and Limitations
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides that a
marriage may not be recognized if such recognition "violates the
strong public policy of another state which had the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage. " 75 Thus, when confronted with an extraterritorial marriage, the

3 See, e.g., Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 354 (1948) (stating that"the regulation
of the incidents of the marital relation involves the exercise by the States of powers of
the most vital importance").
0 See ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 59, § 13.15, at 455 (addressing those situations
involving more than one domicile).
70 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) cmt. k (1971)
("The forum will apply its own legal principles in determining whether a given policy
is a strong one within the meaning of the present rule."); SCOLES & HAY, supra note
59, § 3.1, at 49 ("[T]he choice-of-law rule determining which state's law is to be used,
ordinarily is a rule of the law of the forum." (footnote omitted)); WARDLE ET AL., supra
note 54, § 3.03, at 9 ("The first rule in 'choice-of-law' questions regarding marriage
formalities is that a court will follow the law of its own jurisdiction.").
71 SeeWARDLE ET AL, supranote 54, § 3.03,
at 9.
7 See id. § 3.03, at 9 & n.3.
See id. § 3.03, at 9 & n.4.
7 For a discussion of the expected treatment of extraterritorial
same-sex marriages, see sources cited infra note 117.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971). For a criticism
of the public policy exception, see Laycock, supra note 41, at 313-15.

1997]

DEENSE OFMARRIA GE ACT

1625

forum state must determine if the state with the most interest in the
marriage has a public policy sufficiently strong to invalidate the
marriage. 76 A state's public policy is generally expressed in its positive
laws and judicial decisions,7 although some courts have made reference to the public policy suggested by natural law.7
The Restatement provides a series of rules to apply in determining the state with the greatest interest in the marriage,7 but in most
cases, "it is the domicile of the parties immediately following the
purported marriage." 0 The domicile of the individuals is thus crucial
to any conflict-of-laws analysis. A state is presumed to have the
strongest interest, relative to other states, regarding the marital relations of its residents."' The domicile rule would clearly encompass a
situation in which residents of one state went to Hawaii to get married
and then returned to their home state. In such an instance, the
domicile state would have the discretion to deny recognition of the
Hawaiian marriage, provided that it had a sufficiently strong public
policy against same-sex marriages.82 It is not clear, however, whether
76 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) cmt. k
(1971) ("[A]
marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where it was contracted will be
held valid everywhere except when its invalidation is required by the strong policy of
another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the
marriage at the time of the marriage."). If a state's public policy against the union is
insufficiently strong, the marriage must be recognized. See, e.g., Bogen v. Bogen, 261
N.W.2d 606, 609 (Minn. 1977) (finding that the state's public policy against marriage
within six months of divorce was not strong enough to warrant nonrecognition of the
extraterritorial marriage). For a discussion of the treatment of marriages between
parties with different domiciles, see SCOLES & HAY, supranote 59, § 13.15, at 455-56.
In See, e.g., Sirois v. Sirois, 50 A.2d 88, 89 (N.H. 1946) (locating the state's public
policy in the common law and statutes); Taliaferro v. Rogers, 248 S.W.2d 835, 838
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1951) (finding public policy in the state's constitution, statutes, and
common law).
78 See, e.g., Roston v. Folsom, 158 F. Supp. 112, 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) (refusing to
recognize a bigamous marriage on grounds that bigamy offends natural law).
79 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICF OF LAWs § 6 (1971).
goMpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865, 877 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (asserting
that the state of intended domicile is the state with the greatest interest in the marriage), affd, 440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971); see also SCOLES& HAY, supranote 59, § 13.8,
at 444 ("[T]he domicile of the parties immediately following the purported mar-

riage ... usually is most concerned with the validity of the marriage. .. ").

S1 See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 296 (1942) (stating that it was
"difficult to perceive how North Carolina could be said to have an interest in Nevada's
domiciliaries superior to the interest of Nevada"). An important aspect of this interest
is reflected in the state's strong interest in having its marriages recognized by other
states. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 283 cmt. i (1971)
("Upholding the validity of a marriage is ... a basic policy in all states.").

See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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this rule would cover a situation in which a same-sex couple was
domiciled in Hawaii both before and after the wedding and changed
its domicile years later. Initially at least, the state with the most
interest in the marriage would be Hawaii, in which case another state
would have to recognize the marriage in the manner Hawaii would.83
This would be so "even if the marriage is contrary to the lexfori and
perhaps regarded as highly distasteful by that law."84 States have thus
recognized marriages that were ....
strongly repugnant85 to their own
public policy, such as those involving incest or minors.
There is even stronger support for the recognition, due to full
faith and credit, of the incidents of an extraterritorial marriage.
Traditionally, states have been more amenable to recognizing a
marriage that is contrary to their public policy for the purpose of
granting incidental rights.16 To illustrate, assume that a same-sex
married couple from Hawaii went on vacation in California and was
involved in a car accident that killed one spouse. The surviving
spouse wants to sue the negligent California driver who caused the
accident. Normally, California would recognize the validity of the
marriage for the purpose of resolving the wrongful death claim, even

"' See, e.g., Gorrasi v. Manzella, 191 N.E. 676, 677 (Mass. 1934) (holding that, where
a married couple had never resided in the state, Massachusetts law could not be
applied to determine the marriage's validity). Once a couple changes domicile, the
interest analysis may change. The longer a couple resides in a state as a married
couple, the greater becomes that state's interest in their marital status. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Reed, 226 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Iowa 1975) (asserting that the court should
apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which a couple cohabited longer).
84 PALSSON, supra note 62, at 35.
See, e.g., In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 6-7 (N.Y. 1953) (recognizing another
state's marriage, deemed incestuous by the laws of the forum, between an uncle and
his niece); see alsoPALSSON, supra note 62, at 36 n.101 (citing cases in which marriages
were recognized even though contrary to the strong public policy of the forum state);
Anthony Dominic D'Amato, Note, Conflict of Laws Rules and the Interstate Recognition of
Same-Sex Marriages, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 911, 918-21 (summarizing cases involving
public policy exceptions). For a thorough, if not particularly current, compilation of
cases dealing with this issue, see Annotation, Public Policy ofForum Against Recognition of
Marriage Valid (or Voidable Only) by the Law of the Place Where It Was Celebrated,As Affected
by Fact That Neither of the Parties Was Domiciled at the Forum at the Time of the Marriage,127
A.L.R. 437 (1940).
See, e.g., In re Estate of Crichton, 228 N.E.2d 799, 806 (N.Y. 1967) (recognizing
property rights in a couple whose marriage was otherwise invalid); WEINTRAUB, supra
note 65, § 5.1B, at 233 ("[W]hether a specific incident of... marriage may be enjoyed
in a particular state depends upon whether enjoyment of the incident would offend a
strongly-held public policy of that state.").
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if that marriage was strongly repugnant to its public policy. This
result may be viewed as a compromise between the competing interests of the marital domicile and the forum state. In the hypothetical,
Hawaii has a strong interest in having the validity of its citizens' marriages recognized. California has a significant interest in enforcing its
negligence laws. Because California will not be recognizing the
marriage as an ongoing relationship, recognition for the limited
purpose of a lawsuit does insufficient violence to California's public
policy to warrant nonrecognition.
Under this standard, states have recognized marital incidents for
limited purposes even when the underlying marriage would have
been denied recognition on strong public grounds-for instance, in
cases of marriage involving incest, minors, or even polygamy.' s Thus,
even if a state had a strong public policy against same-sex marriages, it
would likely recognize at least some of the incidents of such a marriage. s9 The DOMA explicitly grants states the right to deny recognition of even the incidents of a same-sex marriage from another state. 0
Thus, even when a state has no interest in an underlying extraterritorial marriage, as in the hypothetical case described above, the
DOMA grants that state absolute power to deny recognition of the
8' See WARDLE ET AL., supra note 54, § 3.03, at 12 (describing how a court "could
properly determine... that some parties are entitled to enjoy the incident of marriage
even though they do not satisfy the requirements for status of marriage").
88 See, e.g., Estate of Hafner v. Hafner, 229 Cal. Rptr. 676, 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(recognizing a bigamous marriage for the purpose of distributing the husband's
estate); May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d at 7 (recognizing an uncle-niece marriage for purpose
of administering the deceased wife's estate); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF
LAws § 284 cmt. c (1971) ("[A] state may prohibit the parties to a polygamous marriage from cohabiting within its territory. Yet it may recognize ... the economic

interests of the spouses .

. .

."). But see Marianacci v. Marianacci, 299 N.Y.S. 146, 148

(N.Y. Fain. CL 1937) (refusing to recognize the incidents of a polygamous marriage).
89 Strengthening this possibility is the acknowledgment by courts, in recent years,
of certain rights of same-sex couples. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478
N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (granting guardianship of a severely braindamaged woman to her same-sex partner); Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 5455 (N.Y. 1989) (interpreting a New York City rent control ordinance to include samesex life partner as a family member); Small v. Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24, 27-28 (Tex. App.
1982, writ ref d n.r.e.) (finding that no public policy considerations precluded a
woman from recovering her share of property accumulated during a long-term,
lesbian relationship). But see Bone v. Allen (In re Allen), 186 B.R. 769, 774 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1995) (denying recognition of same-sex partner as a "spouse" for purposes of
bankruptcy proceeding); In re Will of Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993) (denying right of survivorship to same-sex life partner).
SeeDefense of Marriage Act § 2(a), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1997) ("No
state ... shall be required to give effect to... a right or claim arising from such [samesex] relationship.").
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other state's valid marriage. The marital state, with its strong interest
in the relationship, has been denied its status as an independent
sovereign. 91 Whatever the Full Faith and Credit Clause means, it does
not mean that a state's sovereignty may be so disregarded.
Compounding this slight to state sovereignty is the exception created by the DOMA for the selective nonrecognition ofjudgments. As
noted above, full faith and credit applies most rigorously to judgments. 92 In spite of the special recognition given to judgments, however, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that "there are some
limitations upon the extent to which a state will be required by the
full faith and credit clause to enforce even the judgment of another
state, in contravention of its own statutes or policy."93 Yet "It]he
situations where a judgment of one State has been denied full faith
and credit in another State, because its enforcement would contravene the latter's policy, have been few and far between."94 Indeed, the
Court has said that "the requirements of full faith and credit, so far as
judgments are concerned, are exacting, if not inexorable." 95
Aware of the preferential treatment ofjudgments, and concerned
that a same-sex couple might avail itself of that advantage, Congress
explicitly included judgments within the purview of the DOMA. 96
Thus, although a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a marriage
would ordinarily bolster a couple's claim for full faith and credit, the
DOMA purports to remove that support. It is therefore unclear
whether a declaratory judgment would assist a same-sex couple in
another state. To some degree, at least, the extent to which the
DOMA will affect the expected recognition of same-sex marriages will

9' See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) ("[E]very State possesses
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.
As a consequence, every State has the power to determine for itself the civil status and
capacities of its inhabitants...."); American Rockwool, Inc. v. Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Corp., 640 F. Supp. 1411, 1429 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (asserting that a state's
application of its own law must not infringe on another state's sovereignty in violation
of full faith and credit).

See supranotes 48-49 and accompanying text.

93 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
94 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948).

294 U.S. 532, 546 (1935).

95Id. at 546 (footnote omitted). But see Laycock, supranote 41, at 258 ("As matters
stand, the Full Faith and Credit Clause means almost nothing, and state courts can
often evade the little that it does mean.").
See H.R REP. NO. 104-664, at 30 (1996) (noting the possibility that "homosexual
couples could obtain a judicial judgment memorializing their 'marriage,'" as the
reason for applying the DOMA to "all three categories of sister-state laws to which full

faith and credit must presumptively be given").
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turn on whether or not the forum state has a strong public policy
against same-sex marriages.
III. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
A. A BriefHistoiy
The history of the movement for same-sex marriage is brief but
has spawned considerable debate.
The first case addressing the
issue of same-sex marriage, Baker v. Nelson, arose in 1971. 9' Since
1971, there have been numerous cases in which a party has sought
judicial recognition of the right to same-sex marriage.
Plaintiffs
have asserted a variety of claims in seeking the right to same-sex
marriage, including claims of fundamental rights,' equal protection
violations,' ' and claims based on equal rights amendments contained
in many state constitutions.1 2 All of these attempts have proven
unsuccessful.

97 This debate is not limited to the heterosexual community. See, e.g., RICHARD D.
MOHR, A MORE PERFECT UNION 31-53 (1994) (arguing that same-sex relationships

meet the definition of marriage and that gay couples need equal access to the courts).
For a discussion of arguments on both sides of the debate within the gay community,
see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE 51-85 (1996); see also

LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 397-406 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993)
(providing articles regarding the gay community's debate over the marriage issue).
'a 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (upholding the state practice of issuing
marriage licenses exclusively to couples of the opposite sex).
See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (per curiam)
(upholding the denial of a marriage license to a same-sex couple); Jones v. Hallahan,
501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (same); Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1996) (same); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. CL App. 1974) (same); see also
Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (denying recognition of
marriage ceremony between two men as basis for citizenship rights), affd, 673 F.2d
1036 (9th Cir. 1982); In reWill of Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)
(denying right of survivorship for same-sex life partner); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476
A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. CL 1984) (refusing to recognize a contract of common-law
marriage between two persons of the same sex).
"0 See, e.g., Dean, 653 A.2d at 309 (asserting the right to marry);Jones,501 S.W.2d at
589 (asserting rights of marriage, association, and free exercise of religion); Storr, 645
N.Y.S.2d at 287 (asserting a right of privacy).
10' See, e.g., Dean, 653 A.2d at 333; Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186; Stors, 645 N.Y.S.2d at
287; Singer,522 P.2d at 1188.
'02 See, e.g., De Santo, 476 A.2d at 953 (basing claim on the equal rights amendment
adopted in the Pennsylvania state constitution); Singer, 522 P.2d at 1188 (asserting
claim based on the Washington state constitution).
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What are the justifications for these decisions? Although some
opinions refer to moral'03 or biological 0 4 arguments, most opinions
rely on the definition of marriage as being limited to a union between
one man and one woman.
These decisions reason that, since marriage has traditionally been understood as involving a man and a
woman, two members of the same sex, by definition, cannot marry.06
In Jones v. Hallahan, the Kentucky court, in an oft-cited opinion,
asserted that same-sex couples are "prevented from marrying... by
their own incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is
defined.', 0 7 This argument is patently circular. The court in Baehrv.
Lewin, in response to the state's definitional argument, "reject[ed]
this exercise in tortured and conclusory sophistry."' 8 It remains to be
seen how states will respond to another state's valid same-sex marriage that defies the traditional definition of marriage.

103

See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (finding

that "given the prevailing mores and moral concepts of this age, one could not
entertain a good faith belief that he could be married to a person of the same sex").
M See, e.g., Singer, 522 P.2d at 1195 (asserting that "marriage exists
as a protected
legal institution primarily because of societal values associated with the propagation of
the human race").
105 See, e.g., Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589 (citing Webster's Dictionary as defining
marriage as "[a] state of being.., united to a person ... of the opposite sex as
husband and wife"); Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186 n.1 (same); De Santo, 476 A.2d at 954 n.1
(citing Webster's Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary, the latter defining marriage
as "the legal union of one man and one woman as husband and wife"); Singer, 522 P.2d
at 1192 ("[Plaintiffs] are being denied entry into the marriage relationship because of
the recognized definition of that relationship as one which may be entered into only
by two persons who are members of the opposite sex.").
106 One court went even further, stating that a man could not be another man's
spouse "any more than a person can simultaneously be man and fish." Slayton v. State,
633 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. App. 1982, no writ). This comparison is misplaced; the
biological impossibility of being both a fish and a mammal is not the same as an
impossibility created by legal and cultural definitions.
107 501 S.W.2d at 589.
100 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993). Relying on a gender-based definition of marriage
also raises some interesting problems in deciding a party's gender for marriage
purposes. For example, in Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1971), the court held that a marriage between two men, when one man thought
the other was a woman, was void ab initio, notwithstanding the other man's sex-change
operation prior to the annulment proceedings. See also In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828,
832 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987) (upholding denial of marriage license to a man and a postoperative female transsexual). But see M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1976) (holding that a marriage between a man and a post-operative female
transsexual was valid).
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B. PublicPolicy Against Same-Sex Marriage

In order to understand how a state might apply a public policy
exception to the recognition of a same-sex marriage, those public
policies disfavoring same-sex unions must be outlined. There are at
least three distinct arguments raised against same-sex marriage: the
procreation argument, the slippery slope argument, and the fear of
validation argument.' 9 The first argument, asserting that marriage is
fundamentally about procreation, is frequently invoked against samesex marriages." The relationship between marriage and procreation
is important, but fails as an argument against same-sex marriage for
two reasons. First, not all opposite-sex couples have the ability or the
desire to procreate; yet this fact would not preclude the recognition
of their marriages. Second, many same-sex couples successfully raise
both biological and adopted children within a family environment.'
The second argument raises the specter of the slippery slope:
that to allow same-sex marriages would lead to the destruction of the
institution of marriage by permitting polygamous and incestuous
relationships. 2 Again, this argument is flawed. The public policy
against polygamy is a protection of monogamy and the stability that
monogamy brings to a marital relationship and society. 3 Same-sex
109See ESKRIDGE, supra note 97, at 137-52 (articulating and attacking these arguments).
"0 See, e.g., Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 717 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974)
(referring to the "public policy that the marriage relationship exists with the result
and for the purpose of begetting offspring" (citation omitted)).
.' The court in Baehr v. Miike found that same-sex couples can, and do, make
successful parents. See Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17
(Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) ("Gay and lesbian parents and same-sex couples can be as
fit and loving parents, as non-gay men and women and different-sex couples."). The
court was not persuaded that the quality of care received in same-sex households was
significantly different than that received in opposite-sex households. See id. at *18
("Defendant has not proved that allowing same-sex marriage will probably result in
significant differences in the development.., of children .... ").
112 For example, many speakers in the debates over the DOMA
portrayed the
concept of same-sex marriage as a bandleader for a parade of horribles that would
result. Congressman Largent wondered, if same-sex marriages were permitted,
"[w]hat logical reason is there to keep us from stopping expansion of that definition
to include three people or an adult and a child, or any other odd combination that we
want to have?... [A]nd it doesn't have to be limited to human beings, by the way."
142 CONG. REC. H7443 (daily ed.July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Largent).
"S See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878) (upholding conviction for
polygamy); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1068 (10th Cir. 1985) (discussing the
public policy against polygamy and describing the public policy "commitment to
monogamy as the cornerstone of its regulation of marriage" (quoting Potter v. Murray
City, 585 F. Supp. 1126, 1137 (D. Utah 1984))).
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couples wish only to have their monogamous relationships
given legal
4
marriages.1
same-sex
polygamous
have
to
not
force,
The final argument addresses the fear of validation: that to allow
same-sex marriages would be to approve or encourage such relationships." s There are two problems with this argument. First, it assumes
that homosexuality is a characteristic that can be affected by approbation. Second, even if homosexuality can and should be discouraged,
there is reason to doubt the viability of this tack. As the Supreme
Court made plain in Romer v. Evans, "'a bare.., desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. ' ""' As this brief discussion suggests, none of the
anticipated policy arguments against same-sex marriages have merit.
Because no state has been confronted with an extraterritorial
same-sex marriage, the use of the public policy exception to deny
recognition of such marriages has never been litigated. It is reasonable to assume, however, that many (if not most) states would argue7
that they have a strong public policy against same-sex marriages."
This sentiment is well-expressed in the state legislatures. Indeed,
"1 The inference to incest is even more tenuous, as society presumably has an
interest in preventing the birth of genetically inbred offspring. See ESKRIDGE, supra
note 97, at 150 (outlining, but ultimately rejecting, this argument).
115Many members of Congress expressed their feelings against homosexuality in
strong terms. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S10,110 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Byrd) ("Woe betide that society... that ... begins to blur that tradition which
was laid down by the Creator in the beginning."). A rather extreme expression of this
argument also can be found injustice Scalia's acerbic dissent in Romer v. Evans. "But I
had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible-murder, for
example, or polygamy, or cruelty to animals-and exhibit even 'animus' toward such
conduct. Surely that is the only sort of 'animus' at issue here: moral disapproval of
homosexual conduct...." 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1633 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
116 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agric.
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973)). There is considerable tension between this decision and the Court's decision
in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of Georgia's criminal sodomy statute as applied to sex between two adult
males. Id. at 196. The Court in Romer did not mention Bowers and thus did not
expressly overrule it. However, justice Scalia, in his dissent, insisted that the Romer
decision "contradicted" Bowers. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia,j., dissenting).
,, For discussions of the expected extraterritorial treatment of a Hawaiian samesex marriage, see Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-of-Law: If We Marry in
Hawaii,Are We Still MarriedWhen We Return Home?, 1994WIs. L. REv. 1033; Deborah M.
Henson, Will Same-Sex MarriagesBe Recognized in Sister States?: FullFaith and Credit and
Due Process Limitations on States' Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of
HomosexualMarriagesFollowingHawaii'sBaehrv. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLEJ. FAM. L.551
(1994); Evan Wolfson, Winning and Keeping Equal Marriage Rights: What Will Follow
Victory in Baehr v. Lewin ?, SUMMARY LEGAL ISSUES (Lambda Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 20, 1996, at 10-11.
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legislation refusing to recognize same-sex marriages has been proposed in thirty-seven states, passed in sixteen states, and remains
pending in one."8 Legislators from several states have expressed
intentions to submit, or re-submit, such legislation." 9 In addition,
cases prior to Baehr in which plaintiffs sought the right to same-sex
marriage have met with universal failure."' Lastly, twenty-two states
still have laws against sodomy," ' which many people interpret as a
proxy for distaste of same-sex relationships. 2
Some indication exists, however, that a few states would not declare a strong public policy against these marriages. For instance, five
states have proposed legislation, never passed, to extend marriage
rights to same-sex couples. A Wisconsin legislator has also vowed to
present a bill granting same-sex marriage rights. 2 The former gov,, See Andrew Sullivan, Hawaiian Aye:

Nearing the Altar on Gay Marriage NEW

REPUBLIC, Dec. 30, 1996, at 15; see also H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 9-10 & n.31 (1996)
(listing the 14 states that had passed such legislation as ofJuly 11, 1996). The number
of states that have passed such legislation is now 18. See HawaiiSeeks Law, supra note 4,
at A15. One of the 18 states to have passed such legislation is Hawaii. See Hawaii's
MarriageLaws, supra note 4, at 1448. In redefining the state marriage laws to apply
only to opposite-sex couples, the legislature called on the Hawaii trial court to consider the issue then pending on appeal in Baehr v. Miike i.n light of this legislation. See
id.
19 SeeJohn Sanko, Legislator Will Ty Again to Ban Same-Sex Marriages,ROCKY MTN.
NEWS, Dec. 5, 1996, at 20A (describing a state representative's intention to
reintroduce such legislation in Colorado after Governor Romer vetoed the last
attempt); Senator to Oppose Gay Marriages,States News Briefs, Dec. 13, 1996, availablein
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (stating that a state senator intends to "push"
legislation in Florida to deny recognition of same-sex marriages because "God created
Adam and Eve ... not Adam and Steve").
,20 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 99. For further discussion of the earlier cases, see
Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, MarriageBetweenPersons of the Same Sex, 63 A.L.R.3d 1199
(1975).
121 See D'Amato, supra note 85, at 926 & n.99 (listing states with current sodomy
laws).
'22 This is a poor proxy at best. First, many sodomy laws do not limit themselves to
acts between members of the same sex. This issue was raised vigorously by the dissent
in Bowers v. Hardwick against the majority's opinion upholding the constitutionality of
Georgia's sodomy laws. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 200 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing "the Court's almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity").
Second, not all same-sex couples engage in sodomy. Lastly, as noted supra note 3, a
same-sex couple need not be a homosexual couple.
'2 See 19 States ConsiderBanning Same-Sex Marriages,SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 25, 1997,
at A20, available in 1997 WL 3402804 (listing the five states as Illinois, Maryland,
Nebraska, Rhode Island, and Washington); see also, e.g., L. 1260, 94th Leg., 2d Sess.
(Neb. 1995).
124 See David Callender, Gay Leaders HereHailMarriageRuling CAP. TIMES (Madison,
Wis.), Dec. 5, 1996, at 2A, available in 1996 WL 13791080 (reporting that state
representative Tammy Baldwin intended to introduce such legislation).
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ernor of Massachusetts announced that his state would recognize a
same-sex marriage from Hawaii as it would any other extraterritorial
marriage, and that he would veto any attempt by the legislature to
provide otherwise.' 5 In addition, although no court has ever granted
a same-sex couple the right to marry, a few decisions have extended
some of the incidents of marriage to same-sex couples.1
With the passage of the DOMA, however, Congress• has
127 tilted the
scales in favor of nonrecognition of same-sex marriages.
Whereas
states would ordinarily have consulted their choice-of-law rules when
asked to recognize another state's marriage, Congress has provided a
means of avoiding this analysis. States no longer have to articulate a
sufficiently compelling public policy against recognition of same-sex
marriages, nor do they have to assert a significant interest in the
marital status of the couple in order to deny recognition of an extraterritorial same-sex marriage.
This differential burden imposed on same-sex marriages may conflict with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Romer, which suggested a shift in the Court's treatment of homosexual issues.128 This
potential consequence did not go unnoticed in the consideration of
the DOMA. For example, Professor Hadley Arkes, in her testimony
before the House Committee on the Judiciary, gave ominous portent
to the anticipated result in the then-pending Romer decision, asserting
that, "many judges.. . will extract from that decision this principle:
that it is now immanently suspect, on constitutional grounds, to plant,
anywhere in the laws, a policy that casts an adverse judgment on
homosexuality .... 129 As a practical matter, the DOMA will relieve
states of both constitutional and comity considerations when
confronted with another state's same-sex marriage and thus reduce
125 SeeJoe

Battenfeld, Gov Would Not Nix Same-Sex Mariages,BOSTON HERALD, Dec.

5, 1996, atAl.
126 See, e.g., cases cited supra note
89.
127 As one member of Congress described it
Which side should have the burden of proof? If Congress does not act, the
burden would be on those in opposition to same-sex marriages to affirmatively block them on a State-by-State basis. If Congress passes this legislation,
those in support [of] same-sex marriages would have to win recognition of
such marriages on a State-by-State basis.
142 CONG. REc. 510,115 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
128 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Address at University of Pennsylvania
Law School
(Nov. 19, 1996) (notes on file with the University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review).
'29 Defense of Marriage Act:
Hearing on HIP. 3396 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 104th Cong. 95-96 (1996) (statement of
Professor Hadley Arkes, Amherst College).
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the likelihood of these marriages gaining extraterritorial
recognition. 3 The question remains whether Congress has the
constitutional power to do this.
IV. THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT
A. The Text

The DOMA contains two substantive provisions. The first, section
2 of the Act, which is at issue here, provides as follows:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian Tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage
under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a
right or claim from such relationship.1

As an initial matter, it bears emphasis that the legislation does not
prevent a state from recognizing another state's same-sex marriage. It
does, however, provide that a state does not have to recognize such a
union, or the incidents flowing therefrom,' if it so chooses. If we
examine the impact of this legislation on a same-sex married couple,
the concerns are readily apparent. If a couple from Hawaii moves to
California, California may refuse, pursuant to federal law, to recognize their marriage, and deny them all of the associated benefits133
1 Cf Kery Murakami, Vote Puts Lawmakers in a Bind-Clinton'sStance is Difficult for
Those Sympathetic with Gay Rights, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 3, 1997, at BI (describing the
concerns state legislators have with voting against legislation like the DOMA for fear of
looking too liberal).
'S1Defense of Marriage Act § 2, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1997). Congress
has never before attempted to provide a means for the nonrecognition of marriages,
even in areas that provoke as much opposition as same-sex marriages. This fact did
not go unobserved in the legislative debates: "'In the nation's history, Congress has
never declared that marriages in one state may not be recognized in another; it has
not done this for polygamous marriages, marriages among minors, incestuous marriages, or bigamous marriages.'" 142 CONG. REc. S10,112 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Boxer) (quoting Professor Cass L Sunstein).
'32 For a discussion of the differing treatment of marriage and its incidents, see
supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
'" See EsKRIDGE, supra note 97, at 2-74 (enumerating and discussing the practical
benefits of marriage in this country and the more general, though equally important,
advantages, such as broader acceptance by society of homosexual relationships,
facilitation of monogamy, and the establishment of a home); see also U.S. GEN.
AccoUNrING OFFIcE,

REP.

No. 16, THEDEFENSE OF MARRIAGE Aar (1997) (reporting

that the application of 1,049 federal laws depends on marital status, and enumerating
the hundreds of federal benefits that are determined by marital status).
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For example, the state may prohibit one spouse from authorizing life-

saving medical treatment for the other, or force one spouse to testify
against the other in a state criminal proceeding. This nonrecognition
will not only be performed with the imprimatur of the federal government, but can be exacted in the absence of either a strong public
policy against same-sex marriage or a strong interest in the particular
marriage at issue.
B. Legislative History: Debates and Testimony
1. The Purpose of the DOMA
The purpose of the DOMA, as described in the report submitted
to the Committee of the Judiciary by its sponsor, was to defend the
institution of marriage and allow each state to choose whether to
recognize same-sex marriages.'34 The debates, however, yield valuable
insights into the real purposes behind the Act and reveal disagreements over many of its aspects.' 5 For example, many proponents of
the Act argued that its purpose was to protect states from having to
recognize another state's same-sex marriage by application of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.
These individuals thus regarded the
legislation as necessary to protect each state's right to regulate marriage within its borders and to not have a repugnant marriage thrust
on it against its will. For example, Senator Nickles, a sponsor of the
proposed DOMA, argued that "[e]nactment of this bill will allow
States to give full and fair consideration of how they wish to address

' See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996). The report goes on, however, to list
other motivations behind House Bill 3396, including an "interest in children," id. at
13, an "interest in promoting heterosexuality," id. at 15 n.53, and a defense of
"traditional notions of morality," id. at 15.
.. The debates also reveal strong disagreement over the entire issue of homosexual relationships in this country, an issue which many feel is the true impetus behind
this legislation. The discussion on the floor of the House and Senate was often
heated. Opponents referred to the bill as "blatant homophobic gay-bashing," 142
CONG. REc. E1320 (daily ed. July 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Collins), and proponents argued that "no society... has lived through the transition to homosexuality
and the perversion [that it brings] ... forth," id. at H7444 (daily ed. July 11, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Coburn). Congressman Coburn frankly asserted that "[the real
debate is about homosexuality and whether or not we sanction homosexuality in this
country." Id. Leaving little doubt about his opinion on the matter, Representative
Coburn referred to the belief of his constituency that "homosexuality is immoral, that
it is based on perversion, that it is based on lust." Id.
'm See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 10 (citing the insecurity of states asjustification for
federal intervention).
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the issue of same-sex marriages instead of rushing to legislate because
of fear that another State's laws may be imposed upon them.",3 7 In
contrast, opponents of the bill (many of whom objected to the concept of same-sex marriage) argued that federal legislation was unnecessary because states could resist such recognition if based on a strong
public policy of the state'38 These individuals also argued that the
DOMA could strip a state's valid marriage license or judgment of all
extraterritorial force, thus denying
like-minded states the opportunity
39
to extend full faith and credit.
'37 142 CONG. REc. S4870 (daily ed. May 8, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles). This
remark lends irony to the relative speed at which Congress passed the DOMA. For
such an important, and unprecedented, piece of legislation, the deliberation was far
from extensive. See id.at H7448 (daily ed.July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Conyers)
(noting that a bill that was "nothing less than unprecedented" had "gone from introduction, to hearing, to subcommittee, full committee, and now the floor in a mere two
month[s'] time"); id. at H7441-42 (statement of Rep. Frank) ("If this is such an
important issue, why are we debating this at a quarter to 1? I must say that for an
important piece of legislation like this to be treated in this fashion is quite shabby.").
The opponents' criticism of the haste was particularly germane, as states will not
be faced with the possibility of an extraterritorial marriage for some time. Although
the Hawaii state court found that the State must issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples, issuance has been suspended pending a final determination by the Hawaii

Supreme Court. SeeJonathan Roos, House Panel to Eye Bill Denying Recognition of Gay
Maiages,DES MOINES REG., Feb. 21, 1997, at 5, available in 1997 WL 6939468. This

move presumably was taken to avoid potential confusion if licenses were issued and
then later revoked. Although this case cannot be appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, as the decision rests on an interpretation of Hawaii's constitution, a
final decision by the Hawaii Supreme Court is unlikely to be reached for at least a year
or two. In addition, since the case was initially filed in 1993, 37 states have proposed
legislation regarding the recognition of same-sex marriages. See Sullivan, supra note
118, at 15. Of these, 18 have passed legislation that would deny recognition to extraterritorial same-sex marriages. See Hawaii Seeks Law, supra note 4, at A15. Thus,
contrary to the concerns voiced by Senator Nickles, the states appear to be responding
to the situation in an efficient manner.
iss
See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 35-36 (describing the dissenting view that states
need no protection). Even the report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
acknowledged that "the Committee believes that States currently possess the ability to
avoid recognizing a same-sex 'marriage' license from another State." Id at 9. For a
discussion of the use of the public-policy exception to deny recognition of extraterritorial marriages, see supra Part II.B.
"%9
It is important to recall here that a state's right to refuse recognition of another
state's marriage is limited. If the forum state has an insufficient interest in the marriage, it will usually be constrained by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to grant
recognition of the marriage. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981)
(finding that a state must have "significant contact or [a] significant aggregation of
contacts" in order to apply its own law); see also Gorrasi v. Manzella, 191 N.E. 676
(Mass. 1934) (holding that, when a married couple had never resided in
Massachusetts, that state's law could not be applied to determine the validity of the
marriage).
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2. The Constitutionality of the DOMA
Much of the debate, as well as the testimony submitted, focused
on whether or not the legislation would pass constitutional muster.
Although a majority of Congress attested to the Act's validity, "' many
of the witnesses who testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
including noted constitutional law scholars, expressed grave doubts
about the Act's constitutionality. 4 1 The majority of the constitutional
debate centered on Congress's power to legislate under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.
Supporters of the legislation argued that
Congress had not exceeded its authority, drawing support from
42
Congress's recent enactment of several statutes under the Clause.
Opponents countered by arguing that, unlike the recently enacted
statutes requiring states to extend full faith and credit to child custody,
child support, and protection orders, the DOMA created43 a narrow
categorical exemption from the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
V.

THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT

A. The Meaning of "GeneralLaws" and the Limits of Congress'sPower
Under the Full Faithand Credit Clause
1. "General Laws"
The scope of Congress's power under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause is unclear. 4 4 The Supreme Court has referred only tangen-

"0 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 26 n.69 (listing statements and reports that
found the Act to be constitutional).
1.1 See, e.g., The Defense of MarriageAct: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the SenateJudiciary
Comm., 104th Cong. 42 (1996) [hereinafter Hearings on MarriageAct] (statement of
Professor Cass R. Sunstein, University of Chicago); 142 CONG. REC. S5931-33 (daily ed.
June 6, 1996) (letter from Professor Laurence H. Tribe).
142 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H7274 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Campbell).
3 See, e.g., id. at H7449 (statement of Rep. Abercrombie). In addition, the fact
that Congress has legislated pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not
conclusive, because the constitutionality of these enactments has never been challenged or addressed by the Supreme Court.
14 There is considerable agreement among commentators, however, that
Congress's power to legislate under the Full Faith and Credit Clause exceeds that
which has been exercised. See, e.g., Corwin, supra note 24, at 388 ("[T]here are few
clauses of the Constitution, the merely literal possibilities of which have been so little
developed as the 'full faith and credit' clause."); Jackson, supra note 24, at 21
(asserting that "it cannot be doubted that Congress is invested with a range of power
greatly exceeding that which it has seen fit to exercise").
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tially to this authority. In a case determining the effect of the Clause
on a divorce decree, the Court remarked, "[w]e, of course, intimate
no opinion as to the scope of Congressional power to legislate under
Article IV, § 1 of the Constitution."' 4 In determining the extent of
Congress's power to legislate, careful consideration must be given to
the phrase "general Laws." Although the drafters appear to have
debated how far Congress's power to decide the "effects" of acts,
records, and proceedings should extend, both sides of the debate
incorporated this "general Laws" language in their proposals. 146 From
this, and from the absence of a generality requirement in any of
Congress's other powers, one can reasonably infer that the drafters
intended Congress's power under the Clause to be exercised only in
broad strokes, and not narrowly to determine the effect of particular

Professor Lynn Wardle, a conflict-of-laws scholar, submitted a written report to the
Senate Judiciary Committee, testifying to her opinion of the constitutionality of the
proposed DOMA. See Lynn Wardle, Concerning S.1740: A More Perfect UnionFederalism in American Marriage Law (July 11, 1996) (written statement submitted to
the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File.
Although Professor Wardle attested to her belief that the DOMA would not violate the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, see id., she conceded that in "rare" situations "in which
the [forum] state was totally without any significant contacts or strong public policy,
and the only interested state recognized same-sex marriage, full faith and credit might
arguably preclude nonrecognition," id.
"5Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 352 n.18 (1948). The Court frequently makes
such noncommittal remarks. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303
(1942) ("Whether Congress has the power to create exceptions [based on public
policy] is a question on which we express no view." (citation omitted)). But cf.
Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 215 n.2 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting) ("The
mandatory force of the full faith and credit clause as defined by this Court may be, in
some degree not yet fully defined, expanded or contracted by Congress.").
As Professor Tribe pointed out, "judicial precedent.., must be sought in analogous areas." 142 CONG. REC. S5932 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (letter of Professor
Laurence H. Tribe). Professor Tribe found an analogy in Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which he described as "another of the Constitution's few
clauses expressly authorizing Congress to enforce a constitutional mandate addressed
to the States." Id. at S5933. Professor Tribe also noted that the Supreme Court has
interpreted Section Five "to mean that Congress may effectuate such a mandate but
may not 'exercise discretion in the other direction [by] enact[ing]' statutes that
'dilute' the mandate's self-executing force." Id. (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966)).
16 See Cook, supra note 24, at 425-26 (noting that
the language of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause was intended by the Framers to give Congress the power to enforce
"legislative actsas well as judgments and all other records andjudicial proceedings" by way
of "general laws").
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acts, records, and proceedings. 47 The DOMA does not look like the
sort of legislation that was intended by the term "general Laws." 8
2. Congress's Power to Legislate
a. The Withdrawalof FullFaithand Credit
Before the DOMA's passage, there was limited debate on what the
"give effect" provision authorized Congress to do. Most of this debate
during consideration of the DOMA, however, centered on the
DOMA's negative aspects, in that it represented the first congressional exemption from full faith and credit. Although there is no
conclusive evidence that this distinction alone would be enough to
invalidate the Act, many have expressed this view. 49
Professor
Laurence Tribe expressed the opinion that "Congress possesses no
power under any provision of the Constitution to legislate any such
categorical exemption from the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
Article IV."'w

147

Although there was considerable congressional debate about whether the Act

exceeded Congress's power, very little was said about this particular aspect of the
Clause. Scholars do not appear to have raised this particular issue either. Some
commentators have assumed that Congress possesses the power to extend or withhold
full faith and credit to specific acts, records, or judicial proceedings. These commentators have made these assumptions implicitly in their discussions, and have offered no
support for these assumptions. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 41, at 331 ("Congress
can... specify[] which state's law gets full effect in each class of cases, and concomitantly, that no other state's law gets any effect in that class of cases."); Sumner, supra
note 24, at 239 (opining that "the members of the Constitutional Convention meant
the clause to be self-executing, but subject to such exceptions, qualifications, and
clarifications as Congress might enact into law" (emphasis added)).
148 The Supreme Court has said, at least in dictum, that "[t]he
Full Faith and
Credit Clause is not to be applied, accordion-like, to accommodate our personal
predilections." Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1948). In another case dealing
with a Nevada divorce decree denied recognition by North Carolina, the Court noted
that fine distinctions are difficult to make because of the "generality of the words of
the full faith and credit clause." Williams, 317 U.S. at 301. This observation suggests
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not lend itself to fine distinctions of any
variety.
149 Cf.sources cited supra note 11 (arguing that the purpose of the Full Faith
and
Credit Clause is to unify the states in a federal system and that this is a positive power
only).
1W142 CONG. REC. S5932 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (letter of Professor Laurence H.
Tribe). Professor Tribe based this conclusion on the fact that the power to exempt
was not expressly delegated to Congress, and is therefore reserved to the states under
the Tenth Amendment. See id.
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In response to Professor Tribe's argument that Congress may not
detract from the otherwise ineluctable force of full faith and credit,
the author of the congressional report asserted that "the power to
prescribe does not distinguish between laws that would add to and
those that would detract from the force of that obligation."'51 The
report's author also expressed the view that "while States are generally
obligated to treat laws of other States as they would their ownCongress retains a discretionary
power to carve out such exceptions as
•
I52
it deems appropriate.
The Committee reached this conclusion by
inferring that the language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which
grants Congress the power to "prescribe the effect [of one state's]
public acts, records, and proceedings" in other states, also confers
upon Congress the power "to specify by statute how States are to treat
laws from other States."53 This inference is unsound, however, because the Full Faith and Credit Clause permits Congress to "prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof."'5 The Clause, rather than giving
Congress complete discretion to determine the effect of any given law
or marriage, suggests that Congress will be administering a largely
self-executing provision.
Having built in a suggestion of congressional discretion in this initial inference, the author of the report
then extrapolates to his conclusion that Congress can "carve out such
exceptions as it deems appropriate."
b. Violation of the Generality Requirement
Even if Congress does possess the power to withhold full faith and
credit in certain situations, the DOMA still raises serious constitutional concerns. In particular, the narrowness of the exception
carved in the DOMA is inconsistent with both the plain meaning and
the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Clause grants
Congress the power to pass "general Laws" regarding the effect of
records, acts and proceedings. 57
This provision might permit
" H.RL REP. No. 104-664, at 26 n.71 (1996).
1 Id. at 25.
55Id.
1
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
'

See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 485 (1813) (observing that if the

"judgments of the state courts ought to be considered prima facie evidence only, [the
Full Faith and Credit Clause] would be utterly unimportant and illusory").
'- H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 25.
17 U.S. CONST. art. IV, §
1.
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Congress to except all marriages from the scope of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, but not specific marriages."" One speaker, in arguing
for passage of the DOMA, opined that "an exception is created if
Congress chooses [to do so] by general law, as opposed to a specific
law to a specific contract."" 9
In his testimony before the SenateJudiciary Committee, Professor
Cass Sunstein expressed concern over the specificity of the DOMA.
Professor Sunstein argued that one way to interpret Congress's power
to legislate under the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to say that
"Congress can single out those state acts and judgments of which it
disapproves and give them no effect in other states. Does this power
exist? It is certainly not clear.... There is no historical evidence that
this.., power was something that the framers thought to grant to
Congress. " '6°
This view is not without problems. Among other things, Congress
has legislated under the Full Faith and Credit Clause in narrow areas
before.
In all of this prior legislation, however, Congress extended
the reach of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. For example, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A requires states to give full faith and credit to child
8 It is clear that Congress only intended to grant states the power to refuse
recognition of extraterritorial same-sex marriages. A proposed amendment that would
have applied section 2 to all marriages was rejected. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 20.
Even assuming Congress could place all marriages outside of the scope of full faith
and credit, such an enactment might implicate other constitutional concerns, such as
Tenth Amendment issues.
159142 CONG. REC. H7274 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Campbell).
This reading of "general Laws" is too narrow. Congress may not pass a "specific law to
a specific contract," id., not because of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but because of
the constitutional prohibition that "[n]o Bill of Attainder... shall be passed." U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
160Hearings on MarriageAct, supra note 141, at 46 (statement of Professor Cass R.
Sunstein, University of Chicago). But see Laycock, supra note 41, at 331 ("Congress can
designate the authoritative state law under the Effects Clause, specifying which state's
law gets full effect in each class of cases, and concomitantly, that no other state's law
gets any effect in that class of cases."). Even if this aspect of the DOMA is not, in itself,
unconstitutional, the stated purpose behind the Act is inconsistent with the policies
embodied in the Clause. This inconsistency, combined with the potentially impermissible line-drawing between opposite and same-sex couples, raises serious constitutional
concerns.
'6' See sources cited supra note 56. That Congress has legislated in narrow areas
before does not answer the constitutional concerns, however, as these recent enactments have not been challenged on constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court did
address the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, but merely
interpreted the Act to provide a rule of enforcement and not a new cause of action.
See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988). The Court did not address the
constitutionality of the legislation as it was not at issue. See id.
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custody and support decrees entered in any other state.' 62 This legislation was designed to end the interstate confusion arising from states
ignoring the valid decrees from other states and fashioning new
decrees based on their own standards for the best interest of the
child.' More importantly, although this legislation targeted a narrow
class of proceedings, it applied to all of the proceedings within that
class. In contrast, the DOMA is the result of Congress sifting through
the categories of acts, records, and judicial proceedings that might
legitimize marriages, and winnowing out the narrow group-those
legitimizing same-sex marriage.
Even if Congress does possess the power to except certain acts,
records, and proceedings from the requirements of full faith and
credit, the DOMA should still be invalidated in that it impermissibly
interferes with the status of the states as independent sovereigns.
B. The Effect of the DOMA on the Status of the States
As Independent Sovereigns
The second aspect of the DOMA that should warrant close judicial scrutiny is the effect this legislation will have on the sovereignty of
the states. There was extended discussion during the legislative
debates of the DOMA regarding the need to protect the states from
having to recognize another state's same-sex marrages.J Proponents
of the DOMA advanced the argument that the legislation protects
65
states from the intrusion of another state's public policy decisions.
This concern, however, does not warrant congressional intervention.
The same criticism was leveled at Nevada's permissive divorce laws in

6

28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).

See 4 WARDLE ET AL, supra note 54, § 40:07, at 46 ("[T]he courts' general
avoidance of clarification on the related issues of full faith and credit.., in custody
matters, caused confusion among various jurisdictions and allowed the state courts to
feel free to disregard custody decisions of other state courts ... ."); see also David Carl
Minneman, Annotation, Recognition and Enforcement of Out-of-State Custody Decree Under §
13 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 US.C. § 1738A(a), 40 A.L.R5th 227 (1996) (detailing cases
recognizing, enforcing, and refraining from modifying orders from other states). This
congressional intervention, in the face of a national problem of custody decrees and
parental kidnapping, see 4 WARDLE ET AL., supra note 54, § 40:07, is consistent with the
purposes underlying the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See discussion supra notes 25-37.
'6 See H.R. REP. 104-664, at 2 (stating that the purpose of the DOMA is to free
states from the "constitutional implications" of one state's recognition of same-sex
marriages).
" See 142 CONG. REc. 54870 (daily ed. May 8, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles)
(referring to states' "fear that another State's laws may be imposed upon them").
'6
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the 1940s. The Supreme Court responded that "such an objection
goes to the application of the full faith and credit clause ' to many
situations.... Such is part of the price of our federal system. 66
Closely related to this point is the fact that whenever a state
asserts its sovereignty, it does so at the expense of another state.
Thus, when Congress purports to strengthen the ability of the fortynine states to resist recognition of the valid same-sex marriages of
Hawaii, this inevitably entails the sacrifice of Hawaii's status as a
sovereign for purposes of regulating the marital status of some of its
residents. One of the DOMA's sponsors insisted that the Act "does
not intrude on the ability of the States to define marriage as they
choose."161 Yet, should Hawaii choose to define marriage to include
same-sex couples, it will have no support for the recognition of those
marriages in other states. This point was well made by one speaker,
reading from a letter submitted by Professor Laurence Tribe:
Such purported authority to dismantle the national unifying shield of
article IV's Full Faith and Credit Clause, far from protecting States'
rights, would destroy one of the Constitution's core guarantees that the
United States of America will remain a union of equal sovereigns, that
no law, not even one favored by a great majority of the States, can ever
reduce any single State's official acts, on any subject, to second-class

status ....
Under the traditional choice-of-law analysis, one state would not
be permitted to apply its own laws to deny recognition of Hawaii's
marriage unless it had both a significant interest in the marriage and
a strong public policy against recognition of such a marriage.' 69 Yet,
the DOMA purports to allow states with minimal or no interest in a
marriage, or lacking a sufficient public policy against same-sex marriages, to refuse to recognize the marriage of another state. In a
statement submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Professor

,6 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942). In contrast, a legislator
referred to plans to have Hawaiian same-sex marriages recognized in other states as
.profoundly undemocratic, and.., surely an abuse of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause." 142 CONG. REC. H7441 (daily ed.July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Canady).
167 142 CONG. REC. S10,103 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Nickles).
'6' Id. at S10,104 (statement of Sen. Moseley-Braun) (quoting 142 CONG. REC.
S5932 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (letter of Professor Laurence H. Tribe)); see also
Hearings on Marriage Act, supra note 141, at 110 (statement of Professor Cass R.
Sunstein, University of Chicago) (arguing that the Full Faith and Credit "clause's
historic function is to ensure that states will treat one another as equals rather than as
competitors").
'69 See supra Part II.B.
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Lynn Wardle, a conflict-of-laws scholar, asserted that a state must have
"a significant contact" and "a significant public policy conflict" before
the DOMA could authorize that state to refuse recognition of a
Hawaii marriage.' 70 This characterization of the DOMA suggests that
the Act only replicates the current conflict-of-laws choices available to
states, yet such a characterization is misleading. As Professor Wardle
conceded, full faith and credit "might arguably preclude nonrecognition" of a same-sex marriage in the absence of such contacts and
policy conflicts.17 ' However, the DOMA requires neither a significant
contact nor a significant policy conflict before nonrecognition.
The sovereignty of the states is also threatened by the encroachment of the federal government in this area. One of the drafters of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause expressed concern that the Clause
would allow the federal government to usurp state powers.1' Echoing
this concern, many opponents of the DOMA cautioned that the Act's
interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause would open the way
for Congress to intrude into any area that it chose: "If Congress
invokes the full faith and credit clause to deny effect to unpopular
State court judgments, why will it stop at gay marriages? " ss This
possible aggrandizement of federal power, at the expense of the
states, should warrant close scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion has argued, the DOMA is constitutionally suspect. It is remarkable in that it represents the first attempt
by Congress to withhold the demands of full faith and credit from a
class of records, acts, and judicial proceedings. Although this anomaly of the DOMA would most likely be insufficient to invalidate the
legislation, its novelty should at least arouse the suspicion of the
SeeWardle, supra note 144, at 128.
171See id.
170

'72 See Cook, supra note 24, at 425 (noting statements by Mr. Randolph).
One
opponent of the DOMA argued that "[t]he Constitution gives Congress no power to
add or subtract from the full faith and credit clause. The States that ratified the
Constitution would never have granted such sweeping authority to Congress .... " 142
CONG. REc. S10,102 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
'73 142 CONG. REc. S10,102 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
This concern was frequently expressed during the debates. See, e.g., id. at S10,118
(statement of Sen. Feinstein) (quoting Professor Sunstein's testimony before the
SenateJudiciary Committee in asserting that "[u]nder the proponents' interpretation,
Congress could simply say that any law that Congress dislikes is of no effect in other

States").
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Supreme Court. The aspect of the DOMA, however, that will require
the closest scrutiny by the Court is the specificity with which the
affected class was drawn. Rather than withholding full faith and
credit from
marriages, or_.extending
full faith and credit to an
entie
o all
judcial
clss
174
entire class ofjudicial proceedings, the DOMA singles out same-sex
marriages for exclusion from the exigencies of full faith and credit.
This Comment takes the position that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not grant Congress such discriminating powers. Rather,
Congress's power to legislate under this Clause is limited to enacting
"general Laws," not specific laws targeting records, acts, and judicial
proceedings with which it disagrees.
Even if Congress does possess the power under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to legislate in this selective manner, the application of
the DOMA in certain circumstances would still violate full faith and
credit requirements. With passage of the DOMA, Congress purports
to grant states the absolute power to deny recognition of another
state's same-sex marriage, or any incident thereof, regardless of the
invalidating state's interest in the marriage and without reference to
that state's public policies. Although some proponents of the DOMA
argued that it bolstered the existing ability of the states to decide
matters of public policy, this legislation goes too far. It must be
recalled that one state asserts its sovereignty only at the expense of
another state's. Thus, although the DOMA appears to expand the
sovereignty of a state which refuses to recognize a Hawaiian same-sex
marriage, it only does so at the cost of Hawaii's sovereignty. The
DOMA strips Hawaii of most of its power and interest in having its
marriages recognized in other states.
The system of independent sovereigns embodied in our government necessarily involves some conflict; "[s]uch is... the price of our
federal system.""5 The possibility of Hawaii recognizing same-sex
marriages is merely one such conflict. Unless and until the states
cannot resolve a conflict among themselves, there is neither need,
nor constitutional support, for congressional intervention. "[E]very
experiment that bubbles up from one of the 50 different state
'laboratories of democracy' [need not be] a national issue in need of

,74See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994) (requiring states to give full faith and credit
to the child support and custody determinations of other states).
175Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302
(1942).
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a single national solution."' 76 Regardless of the eventual fate of the
DOMA, however, it remains a crucial piece of legislation for full faith
and credit jurisprudence because it will provide the Court with a
much needed opportunity to examine and determine the precise
meaning of "general Laws" and the parameters of Congress's power
to legislate under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
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James P. Pinkerton, The Principleof States Rights: ConservativesShould Embrace Gay

MarriageRuling, RECORD (Bergen, N.J.), Dec. 10, 1996, at L13, available in 1996 WL
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